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Abstract
We study ordinal approximation algorithms for maximum-weight bipartite matchings. Such
algorithms only know the ordinal preferences of the agents/nodes in the graph for their preferred
matches, but must compete with fully omniscient algorithms which know the true numerical
edge weights (utilities). Ordinal approximation is all about being able to produce good results
with only limited information. Because of this, one important question is how much better the
algorithms can be as the amount of information increases. To address this question for forming
high-utility matchings between agents in X and Y, we consider three ordinal information types:
when we know the preference order of only nodes in X for nodes in Y, when we know the
preferences of both X and Y, and when we know the total order of the edge weights in the
entire graph, although not the weights themselves. We also consider settings where only the top
preferences of the agents are known to us, instead of their full preference orderings. We design
new ordinal approximation algorithms for each of these settings, and quantify how well such
algorithms perform as the amount of information given to them increases.
1 Introduction
Many important settings involve agents with preferences for different outcomes. Such settings
include, for example, social choice and matching problems. Although the quality of an outcome
to an agent may be measured by a numerical utility, it is often not possible to obtain these exact
utilities when forming a solution. This can occur because eliciting numerical information from
the agents may be too difficult, the agents may not want to reveal this information, or even
because the agents themselves do not know the exact numerical values. On the other hand, eliciting
ordinal information (i.e., the preference ordering of each agent over the outcomes) is often much
more reasonable. Because of this, there has been a lot of recent work on ordinal approximation
algorithms: these are algorithms which only use ordinal preference information as their input, and
yet return a solution provably close to the optimum one (e.g., [3–5,9–12,17]). In other words, these
are algorithms which only use limited ordinal information, and yet can compete in the quality
of solution produced with omniscient algorithms which know the true (possibly latent) numerical
utility information.
Ordinal approximation is all about being able to produce good results with only limited in-
formation. Because of this, it is important to quantify how well algorithms can perform as more
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information is given. If the quality of solutions returned by ordinal algorithms greatly improves
when they are provided more information, then it may be worthwhile to spend a lot of resources
in order to acquire such more detailed information. If, on the other hand, the improvement is
small, then such an acquisition of more detailed information would not be worth it. Thus the main
question we consider in this paper is: How does the quality of ordinal algorithms improve as the
amount of information provided increases?
In this paper, we specifically consider this question in the context of computing a maximum-
utility matching in a metric space. Matching problems, in which agents have preferences for which
other agents they want to be matched with, are ubiquitous. The maximum-weight metric matching
problem specifically provides solutions to important applications, such as forming diverse teams
and matching in friendship networks (see [4, 5] for much more discussion of this). Formally, there
exists a complete undirected bipartite graph for two sets of agents X and Y of size N , with an edge
weight w(x, y) representing how much utility x ∈ X and y ∈ Y derive from their match; these edge
weights satisfy the triangle inequality. The algorithms we consider, however, do not have access to
such numerical edge weights: they are only given ordinal information about the agent preferences.
The goal is to form a perfect matching between X and Y, in order to approximate the maximum
weight matching as much as possible using only the given ordinal information. We compare the
weight of the matching returned by our algorithms with the true maximum-weight perfect matching
in order to quantify the performance of our ordinal algorithms.
Types of Ordinal Information Ordinal approximation algorithms for maximum weight match-
ing have been considered before in [4,5], although only for complete graphs; algorithms for bipartite
graphs require somewhat different techniques. Our main contribution, however, lies in considering
many types of ordinal information, forming different algorithms for each, and quantifying how much
better types of ordinal information improve the quality of the matching formed. Specifically, we
consider the following types of ordinal information.
• The most restrictive model we consider is one-sided preferences. That is, only preferences for
agents in X over agents in Y are given to our algorithm. These preferences are assumed to
be consistent with the (hidden) agent utilities, i.e., if x prefers y1 to y2, then it must be that
w(x, y1) ≥ w(x, y2). Such one-sided preferences may occur, for example, when X represents
people and Y represents houses. People have preferences over different houses, but houses do
not have preferences over people. These types of preferences also apply to settings in which
both sides have preferences, but we only have access to the preferences of X , e.g., because
the agents in Y are more secretive.
• The next level of ordinal information we consider is two-sided preferences, that is, both pref-
erences for agents in X over Y and agents in Y over X are given. This setting could apply
to the situation that two sets of people are collaborating, and they have preferences over
each other, or of a matching between job applicants and possible employers. As we consider
the model in a metric space, the distance (weight) between two people could represent the
diversity of their skills, and a person prefers someone with most diverse skills from him/her
in order to achieve the best results of collaboration.
• The most informative model which we consider in this paper is that of total-order. That is, the
order of all the edges in the bipartite graph is given to us, instead of only local preferences for
each agent. In this model, global ordinal information is available, compared to the preferences
of each agent in the previous two models. Studying this setting quantifies how much efficiency
is lost due to the fact that we only know ordinal information, as opposed to the fact that we
only know local information given to us by each agent.
2
Comparing the results for the above three information types allows us to answer questions like:
“Is it worth trying to obtain two-sided preference information or total order information when
only given one-sided preferences?” However, above we always assumed that for an agent x, we are
given their entire preferences for all the agents in Y. Often, however, an agent would not give
their preference ordering for all the agents they could match with, and instead would only give an
ordered list of their top preferences. Because of this, in addition to the three models described
above, we also consider the case of partial ordinal preferences, in which only the top α fraction of
a preference list is given by each agent of X . Thus for α = 0 no information at all is given to us,
and for α = 1 the full preference ordering of an agent is given. Considering partial preferences tells
us when, if there is a cost to buying information, we might choose to buy only part of the ordinal
preferences. We establish tradeoffs between the percentage of available preferences and the possible
approximation ratio for all three models of information above, and thus quantify when a specific
amount of ordinal information is enough to form a high-quality matching.
Our Contributions We show that as we obtain more ordinal information about the agent
preferences, we are able to form better approximations to the maximum-utility matching, even
without knowing the true numerical edge weights. Our main results are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: α vs. approximation ratio for par-
tial information. As we obtain more infor-
mation about the agent preferences (α in-
creases), we are able to form better approx-
imation to the maximum-weight matching.
The tradeoff for one-sided preferences is lin-
ear, while it is more complex for two-sided
and total order.
Using only one-sided preference information, with only the order of top αN preferences given
for agents in X , we are able to form a (3 − (2 − √2)α)-approximation. We do this by combining
random serial dictatorship with purely random matchings. When α = 1, the algorithm yields
a (
√
2 + 1)-approximation. This is the first non-trivial analysis for the performance of RSD on
maximum bipartite matching in a metric space, and this analysis is one of our main contributions.
Given two-sided information, with the order of top αN preferences for agents in both X and Y,
we can do significantly better. When α ≥ 12 , adopting an existing framework in [4], by mixing greedy
and random algorithms, and adjusting it for bipartite graphs, we get a (3−2α)(3−α)
2α2−3α+3 -approximation.
When α ≤ 12 , the framework would still work, but would not produce a good approximation. We
instead design a different algorithm to get better results. Inspired by RSD, we take advantage
of the information of preferences from both sets of agents, adjust RSD to obtain “undominated”
edges in each step, and finally combine it with random matchings to get a (3− α)-approximation.
When α ≥ 34 , the algorithm yields a 1.8-approximation.
For the total-ordering model, the order of top αN2 heaviest edges in the bipartite graph is given.
We use the framework in [4] again to obtain a 2+
√
1−α
2−√1−α -approximation. Here we must re-design the
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framework to deal with the cases that α ≤ 34N , which is not a straight-forward adjustment. When
α ≥ 34N the algorithm yields a 53 -approximation.
Finally, in Section 6 we analyze the case when edge weights cannot be too different: the highest
weight edge is at most β times the lowest weight edge in one-sided model. When the edge weights
have this relationship, we can extend our analysis to give a (
√
β − 34 + 12)-approximation, even
without assuming that edge weights form a metric.
Discussion and Related Work Previous work on forming good matchings can largely be
classified into the following classes. First, there is a large body of work assuming that numerical
weights or utilities don’t exist, only ordinal preferences. Such work studies many possible objectives,
such as forming stable matchings (see e.g., [15,16]), or maximizing objectives determined only by the
ordinal preferences (e.g., [2, 8]). Second, there is work assuming that numerical utilities or weights
exist, and are known to the matching designer. Unlike the above two settings, we consider the
case when numerical weights exist, but are latent or unknown, and yet the goal is to approximate
the true social welfare, i.e., maximum weight of a perfect matching. Note that although some
previous work assumes that all numerical utilities are known, they often still use algorithms which
only require ordinal information, and thus fit into our framework; we discuss some of these results
below.
Similar to our one-sided model, house allocation [1] is a popular model of assigning n agents to
n items. [6] studied the ordinal welfare factor and the linear welfare factor of RSD and other ordinal
algorithms. [14] studied both maximum matching and maximum vertex weight matching using an
extended RSD algorithm. These either used objectives depending only on ordinal preferences,
such as the size of the matching formed, or used node weights (as opposed to edge weights).
[11] and [9] assumed the presence of numerical agent utilities and studied the properties of RSD.
Crucially, this work assumed normalized agent utilities, such as unit-sum or unit-range. This
allowed [9, 11] to prove approximation ratios of Θ(
√
n) for RSD. Instead of assuming that agent
utilities are normalized, we consider agents in a metric space; this different correlation between
agent utilities allows us to prove much stronger results, including a constant approximation ratio
for RSD. Kalyanasundaram et al. studied serial dictatorship for maximum weight matching in a
metric space [13], and gave a 3-approximation for RSD in this, while we are able to get a tighter
bound of 2.41-approximation.1
Besides maximizing social welfare, minimizing the social cost of a matching is also popular. [7]
studied the approximation ratio of RSD and augmentation of serial dictatorship (SD) for minimum
weight matching in a metric space. Their setting is very similar to ours, except that we consider
the maximization problem, which has different applications [4, 5], and allows for a much better
approximation factor (constant instead of linear in n) using different techniques.
Another area studying ordinal approximation algorithms is social choice, where the goal is to
decide a single winner in order to maximize the total social welfare. This is especially related to
our work when the hidden utilities of voters are in a metric space (see e.g., [3, 10,12,17]),
The work most related to ours is [4, 5]. As mentioned above, we use an existing framework [4]
for the two-sided and the total-order model. While the goal is the same: to approximate the
maximum weight matching using ordinal information, this paper is different from [4] in several
aspects. [4] only considered approximating the true maximum weight matching for non-bipartite
complete graphs. We instead focus on bipartite graphs, and especially on considering different
levels of ordinal information by analyzing three models with increasing amount of information, and
1Note that many of the papers mentioned here specifically attempt to form truthful algorithms. While RSD is
certainly truthful, in this paper we attempt to quantify what can be done using ordinal information in the presence
of latent numerical utilities, and leave questions of truthfulness to future work.
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also consider partial preferences. Although we use similar techniques for parts of two-sided and
total-order model analysis, they need significant adjustments to deal with bipartite graphs and
partial preferences; moreover, the method used for analyzing the one-sided model is quite different
from [4].
2 Model and Notation
For all the problems studied in this paper, we are given as input two sets of agents X and Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . G = (X ,Y, E) is an undirected complete bipartite graph with weights on the
edges. We assume that the agent preferences are derived from a set of underlying hidden edge
weights w(x, y) for each edge (x, y), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y. w(x, y) represents the utility of the match
between x and y, so if x prefers y1 to y2, then it must be that w(x, y1) ≥ w(x, y2). Let OPT (G)
denote the complete bipartite matching that gives the maximum total edge weights. w(G) of any
bipartite graph G is the total edge weight of the graph, and w(M) of any matching M is the total
weight of edges in the matching. The agents lie in a metric space, by which we will only mean that,
∀x1, x2 ∈ X , ∀y1, y2 ∈ Y, w(x1, y1) ≤ w(x1, y2) + w(x2, y1) + w(x2, y2). We assume this property in
all sections except for Section 6.
For the setting of one-sided preferences, ∀x ∈ X , we are given a strict preference ordering Px
over the agents in Y. When dealing with partial preferences, only top αN agents in Px are given to
us in order. We assume αN is an integer, α ∈ [0, 1]. Of course, when α = 0, nothing can be done
except to form a completely random matching. For two-sided partial preferences, we are given both
the top α fraction of preferences Px of agents x in X over those in Y, and vice versa. For the total
order setting, we are given the order of the highest-weight αN2 edges in the complete bipartite
graph G = (X ,Y, E).
3 One-sided Ordinal Preferences
For one-sided preferences, our problem becomes essentially a house allocation problem to maximize
social welfare, see e.g., [9, 11, 14]. Before we proceed, it is useful to establish a baseline for what
approximation factor is reasonable. Simply picking a matching uniformly at random immediately
results in a 3-approximation (see Theorem 2), and there are examples showing that this bound is
tight. Other well-known algorithms, such as Top Trading Cycle, also cannot produce better than a
3-approximation to the maximum weight matching for our setting. Serial Dictatorship, which uses
only one-sided ordinal information, is also known to give a 3-approximation to the maximum weight
matching for our problem [13]. Serial Dictatorship simply takes an arbitrary agent from x ∈ X ,
assigns it x’s favorite unallocated agent from Y, and repeats. Unfortunately, it is not difficult to
show that this bound of 3 is tight. Our first major result in this paper is to prove that Random
Serial Dictatorship always gives a (
√
2 + 1)-approximation in expectation, no matter what the true
numerical weights are, thus giving a significant improvement to all the algorithms mentioned above.
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Algorithm 1: Random Serial Dictatorship for Perfect Matching of one-sided ordering.
Initialize M = ∅, G = (X ,Y, E) ;
while E 6= ∅ do
Pick an agent x uniformly at random from X ;
Let y denote x’s most preferred agent in Y ;
Take e = (x, y) from E and add it to M ;
Remove x, y, and all edges containing x or y from the graph G ;
end
Final Output: Return M .
Theorem 1. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . Then, the expected weight of the perfect matching M returned by Algorithm 1 is
E[w(M)] ≥ 1√
2+1
w(OPT (G)).
Proof. Notation: Consider a bipartite subgraph S ⊆ G, that satisfies S = (X ′,Y ′, E′), X ′ ⊆
X , Y ′ ⊆ Y, and |X ′| = |Y ′|. Let Min(S) denote a minimum weight perfect matching on S, and
RSD(S) denote the expected weight returned by Algorithm 1 on graph S.
For any x ∈ X ′, we use λ(S, x) to denote the edge between x and its most preferred agent in
Y ′. Define R(S, x) as the remaining graph after removing x, x’s most preferred agent, and all the
edges containing x or x’s most preferred agent from S.
We begin by simply expressing RSD(S) in terms of these quantities.
Lemma 1. For any subgraph S as decribed above,
RSD(S) = 1|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′ w(λ(S, x)) +
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′ RSD(R(S, x)).
Proof. This simply follows from definition of expectation. In the first round of Algorithm 1, an
agent x is selected uniformly at random from X ′. Given that x is selected, the edge added to the
matching is exactly λ(S, x), and the expected weight of the matching for the remaining graph is
exactly RSD(R(S, x)). Each of these occurs with probability 1/|X ′|.
We now state the main technical lemma which allows us to prove the result. This lemma gives
a bound on the maximum weight matching in terms of the quantities defined above.
Lemma 2. For any given graph G = (X ,Y, E), one of the following two cases must be true:
Case 1: w(OPT (G)) ≤ 1|X |
∑
x∈X w(OPT (R(x))) +
√
2+1
|X |
∑
x∈X w(λ(x))
Case 2: w(OPT (G)) ≤ (√2 + 1)w(Min(G))
We will prove this lemma below, but first we discuss how the rest of the proof will proceed.
When Case 1 above holds, we know that at any step of the algorithm, the change in the weight of the
optimum solution in the remaining graph is not that different from the weight of the edge selected
by our algorithm. This allows us to compare the weight of OPT with the weight of the matching
returned by our algorithm. In fact, this is the technique used in a previous paper [5] to analyze
RSD for complete graphs (i.e., non-bipartite graphs), and show that RSD gives a 2-approximation
for perfect matching on complete graphs. Similar to Case 1 in Lemma 2, this was done by proving
that in each step, the expected loss of optimal matching is at most twice the expected weight of
the chosen edge, and thus the emtire algorithm gives a 2-approximation.
It is important to note here that this does not work for bipartite graphs. In bipartite matching,
using only this method will not give an approximation ratio better than 3. To see this, consider the
bipartite graph in Figure 2. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph, |X | = |Y| = N .
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The edges shown in the Figure are the maximum weight matching of G; all the other edges have
weight of 1. It is easy to see that these edge weights form a metric. ∀x ∈ X , x’s most preferred
agent in Y is y1, second preferred agent is y2, ..., least preferred agent is yn (we can always perturb
the edge weights by an infinitesimal amount to remove ties for this example). Then the weight of
the optimum solution is w(OPT (G)) = (N − 1) + 3. In this example, the expected decrease in the
weight of the optimal matching in the first step of RSD is 3: choosing x1 loses 3, and choosing any
other agent xi in X loses 3 since (x1, y1) and (xi, yi) can no longer ne used (decrease of 4), but
the edge (x1, yi) can be used (increase of 1). On the other hand, the expected weight of the edge
chosen by RSD is 3+(N−1)N . In this case, almost 3 times the expected weight of the chosen edge is
needed to compensate for the loss of optimal matching, so the inequality in “Case 1” above only
holds if we replace
√
2 + 1 with 3, and thus would only result in a 3-approximation.
Figure 2: An example graph for RSD.
We get around this problem by adding Case 2 to our lemma. We are able to show that in any
step, either the expected loss of the weight of the optimal matching is at most (
√
2 + 1) times of
expected weight of the chosen edge, or the weight of the optimal matching is at most (
√
2 + 1)
times weight of the minimum weight matching. By combining these two cases, we can easily show
the following claim which completes the proof of the theorem.
Proposition 1. As long as Lemma 2 is obeyed for every S, Algorithm 1 provides a (
√
2 + 1)-
approximation to the Maximum weight perfect matching: RSD(G) ≥ 1√
2+1
w(OPT (G)).
Proof. We proceed by induction. Clearly when G only has two agents, RSD produces the op-
timum matching. Now consider a bipartite graph G = (X ,Y, E) with |X | = |Y| = N , and
suppose that the claim is true for all smaller graphs, i.e., ∀x ∈ X , we know that RSD(R(G, x)) ≥
1√
2+1
w(OPT (R(G, x))).
If Case 2 in Lemma 2 holds for G, then because Min(G) is the minimum weight perfect match-
ing, we know that w(Min(G)) ≤ RSD(G). So RSD(G) ≥ 1√
2+1
w(OPT (G)). Otherwise Case 1 in
Lemma 2 must be true.
w(OPT (G)) ≤ 1
N
∑
x∈X
w(OPT (R(G, x))) +
√
2 + 1
N
∑
x∈X
w(λ(G, x))
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By our assumption,
w(OPT (G)) ≤
√
2 + 1
N
∑
x∈X
RSD(R(G, x)) +
√
2 + 1
N
∑
x∈X
w(λ(G, x))
This completes the proof by Lemma 1.
We now proceed with the main technical part of the proof, i.e., the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2 For compactness of notation, since S is fixed, we will omit S and simply
write λ(x) and R(x) instead of λ(S, x) and R(S, x). For any fixed x ∈ X ′, denote x’s most preferred
agent in Y ′ as y (so λ(x) = (x, y)). In OPT (S), suppose x is matched to b ∈ Y ′, and y is matched
to a ∈ X ′. In Min(S), suppose b is matched to m ∈ X ′. ∀x ∈ X ′, there exist y, a, b, m as described
above. As shown in Figure 3, denote edge (x, y) by λ(x), (x, b) by P (x), (a, y) by P¯ (x), and (a, b)
by D(x).
Figure 3: Notation of λ(x), P (x), P¯ (x), D(x).
We’ll prove Lemma 2 by showing that if Case 2 is not true, then Case 1 must be true. Suppose
Case 2 is not true, i.e., w(OPT (S)) > (
√
2 + 1)w(Min(S)).
Suppose that random serial dictatorship picks x ∈ X ′. Then OPT (R(S, x)) is at least as good
as the matching obtained by removing P (x) and P¯ (x), and adding D(x) to OPT (S) (the rest stay
the same):
w(OPT (R(x))) ≥ w(OPT (S))− w(P (x))− w(P¯ (x)) + w(D(x))
Note that when λ(x) ∈ OPT (S), P¯ (x) = P (x) = D(x), and the inequality still holds. Summing
this up over all nodes x, we obtain:
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (R(x))) ≥ 1|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
(w(OPT (S))− w(P (x))− w(P¯ (x)) + w(D(x)))
= w(OPT (S))− 1|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
(w(P (x)) + w(P¯ (x))− w(D(x)))
= (1− 1|X ′|)w(OPT (S))−
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
(w(P¯ (x))− w(D(x))) (1)
In Figure 3, by the triangle inequality, we know that
w(a, y) ≤ w(a, b) + w(m, b) + w(m, y)
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Note that when y = b the inequality still holds, because w(a, y) = w(a, b). It also holds when a = m
for the same reason.
Because λ(m) is the edge to m’s most preferred agent, w(m, y) ≤ w(λ(m)), and thus
w(P¯ (x)) ≤ w(D(x)) + w(m, b) + w(λ(m)))
Summing this up for all x ∈ X ′, note that each x is matched to a unique b in OPT (S), and
each b is matched to a unique m in Min(S), so each agent in Y ′ appears as b exactly once and each
agent in X ′ appears as m exactly once.∑
x∈X ′
w(P¯ (x)) ≤
∑
x∈X ′
w(D(x)) + w(Min(S)) +
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x)))
∑
x∈X ′
(w(P¯ (x))− w(D(x))) ≤ w(Min(S)) +
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x))) (2)
Combining Inequality 1 and Inequality 2,
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (R(x))) ≥ (1− 1|X ′|)w(OPT (S))−
1
|X ′| [w(Min(S)) +
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x))] (3)
∀x ∈ X ′, w(P (x)) ≤ w(λ(x)) since λ(x) is the most preferred edge of x, so it is obvious that
w(OPT (S)) ≤∑x∈X ′ w(λ(x)).
By our assumption,
w(Min(S)) <
1√
2 + 1
w(OPT (S)) ≤ 1√
2 + 1
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x))
Thus, putting this together with Inequality 3, we obtain that,
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (R(x))) ≥ w(OPT (S))− 1|X ′|(2 +
1√
2 + 1
)
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x)))
= w(OPT (S))−
√
2 + 1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x))
Partial One-sided Ordinal Preferences
In this section, we consider the case when we are given even less information than in the previ-
ous one, i.e., only partial preferences. We begin by establishing the following easy result for the
completely random algorithm.
Algorithm 8: Random Algorithm for Perfect Bipartite Matching.
Initialize M = ∅, G = (X ,Y, E) ;
while E 6= ∅ do
Pick an edge e = (x, y) from E uniformly at random and add it to M ;
Remove x, y, and all edges containing x or y from G ;
end
Final Output: Return M .
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Lemma 3. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . Then, the expected weight of the random perfect matching returned by Algorithm 8
for the input G is E[w(M)] = 1N
∑
(x,y)∈E w(x, y).
This lemma was proved in [4].
Theorem 2. The uniformly random perfect matching is a 3-approximation to the maximum-weight
matching.
Proof. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y ⊆ N with
|X | = |Y| = N . Let OPT be the optimal perfect matching. Suppose (x, y) is an edge in OPT .
Then for any edge (a, b) ∈ E , by triangle inequality,
w(x, y) ≤ w(x, b) + w(a, y) + w(a, b)
Summing up for all (a, b) ∈ E ,
N2w(x, y) ≤ N
∑
b∈Y
w(x, b) +N
∑
a∈X
w(a, y) +
∑
(a,b)∈E
w(a, b)
Summing up for all (x, y) ∈ OPT ,
N2w(OPT ) ≤ N
∑
(a,b)∈E
w(a, b) +N
∑
(a,b)∈E
w(a, b) +N
∑
(a,b)∈E
w((a, b) = 3N
∑
(a,b)∈E
w(a, b)
Let M be the matching returned by Algorithm 8. Then, by Lemma 3,
E[w(M)] =
1
N
∑
(a,b)∈E
w(a, b) ≥ 1
3
w(OPT )
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Perfect Matching given partial one-sided ordering.
Run Algorithm 1, stop when |M | = αN , then form random matches until all agents are
matched. Return M .
Theorem 3. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . There is a strict preference ordering Px over the agents in Y for each agent x ∈ X .
We are only given top αN agents in Px in order. Then, the expected weight of the perfect matching
M returned by Algorithm 2 is E[w(M)] ≥ 1
3−(2−√2)αw(OPT (G)), as shown in Figure 1.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1. We would like to apply our main
technical result (Lemma 2) to analyze this algorithm. Define Algi(S) as the expected weight of
chosen edge in round i of RSD on any subgraph S. For any bipartite graph S, let Rand(S) denote
the expected weight of the perfect matching returned by Algorithm 8, and Avg(S) denote the
average weight of edges in S.
We begin by bounding w(OPT (G)) by the sum of expected weights of chosen edges in RSD,
and the weight of the remaining subgraph.
10
Lemma 4. Let L(G, `) be the subgraph of G after ` rounds of RSD, which has N − ` nodes both in
X and Y. Note that L(G, `) is a random variable. Then we have that:
w(OPT (G)) ≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑`
i=1
Algi(G) + 3E[Rand(L(G, `))]
Proof. We prove this by induction on `. For the Base Case, when ` = 0, then this simply reduces
to Theorem 3. Now assume by the inductive hypothesis that, ∀x ∈ X ,
w(OPT (R(G, x))) ≤ (
√
2 + 1)
`−1∑
i=1
Algi(R(G, x)) + 3E[Rand(L(R(G, x), `− 1))]
If Case 1 in Lemma 2 holds for G, then
w(OPT (G)) ≤
√
2 + 1
|X |
∑
x∈X
w(λ(G, x)) +
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
w(OPT (R(G, x)))
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑`
i=1
Algi(G) + 3E[Rand(L(G, `))]
The last inequality is simply because of the inductive hypothesis, and the fact that E[Rand(L(G, `))] =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X E[Rand(L(R(G, x), `− 1))]. If instead Case 2 in Lemma 2 holds for G, then
w(OPT (G)) ≤ (
√
2 + 1)w(Min(G))
Let’s consider a perfect matching on G generated by running RSD for ` rounds, and then obtaining
the minimum weight matching for the remaining subgraph. By the definition of Min(G), the weight
of the matching described above is no less than Min(G):
w(OPT (G)) ≤ (
√
2 + 1)w(Min(G))
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑`
i=1
Algi(G) + (
√
2 + 1)E[w(Min(L(G, `)))]
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑`
i=1
Algi(G) + (
√
2 + 1)E[Rand(L(G, `))]
≤ (
√
2 + 1)
∑`
i=1
Algi(G) + 3E[Rand(L(G, `))]
To finish the proof of the theorem, we need to be able to compare Rand(L(G, `)) and Algi.
After all, if the random part of our matching is much larger in weight than the RSD part, then the
random part will dominate, resulting in only a 3 approximation. Fortunately, it is not hard to see
the following lemma. Let G′ = L(G,αN) be a random variable representing the graph obtained by
running RSD on G for αN rounds, which we can always do if we are given the top αN preferences
of every agent.
Lemma 5. ∀i ≤ αN , Algi(G) is heavier than the expected average edge weight in G′, i.e., Algi(G) ≥
E[Avg(G′].
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Proof. First notice that Alg1(G) ≥ Alg2(G). This is true because:
Alg2(G) =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
1
|X | − 1
∑
y∈X−x
w(λ(R(G, x), y))
≤ 1|X |
∑
x∈X
1
|X | − 1
∑
y∈X−x
w(λ(G, y))
=
|X | − 1
|X |(|X | − 1)
∑
y∈X
w(λ(G, y))
= Alg1(G)
The inequality above is simply because the best edge leaving y in a smaller graph R(G, x) is
at most the best edge leaving it in a larger graph G. By the same argument, we know that
Algi(G) ≥ Algi+1(G) for all i.
Now consider an arbitrary complete graph S = (X ′,Y ′, E′) with |X ′| = |Y ′|. One way to think
of Avg(S) is as an expected value of the following randomized algorithm: take a node x in X ′
uniformly at random, and then take a random edge leaving that node, and return its weight. The
expected value returned by this algorithm is exactly the expected weight of an edge in S taken
uniformly at random, i.e., exactly Avg(S). Compare this algorithm with the performance of RSD;
RSD does exactly the same thing in the first round, but chooses the best edge coming out of x
instead of a random edge. Therefore, the first round of RSD on any graph always performs better
than the average edge weight. In particular, this is true for every instantiation of the graph G′,
and thus AlgαN+1(G) ≥ E[Avg(G′)]. This concludes the proof.
Finally, let’s finish the proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 4,
w(OPT (G)) ≤ (
√
2 + 1)
αN∑
i=1
Algi(G) + 3E[Rand(G
′)]
= (
√
2 + 1)
αN∑
i=1
Algi(G) + 3(1− α)N × E[Avg(G′)],
By Lemma 5,
αN∑
i=1
Algi(G) ≥ αN × E[Avg(G′)],
and thus,
w(OPT (G)) ≤ (3− (2−
√
2)α)(
αN∑
i=1
Algi(G) + (1− α)N × E[Avg(G′)])
= (3− (2−
√
2)α)(
αN∑
i=1
Algi(G) + E[Rand(G
′)])
Note that
∑αN
i=1Algi(G)+E[Rand(G
′)] is the expected weight of M , which completes the proof:
w(OPT (G)) ≤ (3− (2−
√
2)α)E[w(M)].
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4 Two-sided Ordinal Preferences
For two-sided preferences, we give separate algorithms for the cases when α ≥ 12 and when α ≤ 12 ,
as these require somewhat different techniques.
α ≥ 1
2
While for the case when α < 12 new techniques are necessary to obtain a good approx-
imation, the approach for the case when α ≥ 12 is essentially the same as the one used in [4].
We adopt this approach to deal with bipartite graphs and with partial preferences, giving us a
1.8-approximation for α = 1. To do this, we re-state the definition of Undominated Edges from [4],
and a standard greedy algorithm for forming a matching of size k.
Definition 1. (Undominated Edges) Given a set E of edges, (x, y) ∈ E is said to be an undominated
edge if for all (x, a) and (y, b) in E, w(x, y) ≥ w(x, a) and w(x, y) ≥ w(y, b).
Note that an undominated edge must always exist: either there are two nodes x and y such that
they are each other’s top preferences (and so (x, y) is undominated), or there is a cycle x1, x2, . . . in
which xi+1 is the top preference of xi, in which case all edges in the cycle must be the same weight,
and thus all edges in the cycle are undominated. This also gives us an algorithm for determining if
an edge (x, y) is undominated: either x and y prefer each other over all other agents, or it is part
of such a cycle of top preferences.
Lemma 6. Given an edge set E of a complete bipartite graph G = (X ,Y, E), the weight of any
undominated edge is at least one third as much as the weight of any other edge in E, i.e., if
e = (x, y) is an undominated edge in E, that x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, then for any (a, b) ∈ E, a ∈ X , b ∈ Y,
w(x, y) ≥ 13w(a, b).
Proof. Since e = (x, y) is an undominated edge, w(x, y) ≥ w(x, b) and w(x, y) ≥ w(a, y). By
triangle inequality, we know that w(a, b) ≤ w(x, y) + w(x, b) + w(a, y) ≤ 3w(x, y).
Algorithm 3: Greedy Algorithm for Max k-Matching of two-sided ordering.
Initialize M = ∅, E is the valid set of edges initialized to the complete bipartite graph G ;
while E 6= ∅ do
Pick an undominated edge e = (x, y) from E and add it to M ;
Remove x, y, and all edges containing x or y from E ;
if |M | = k then
break ;
end
end
Final Output: Return M .
Before stating the full algorithm for the case when α ≥ 12 , we mention two lemmas which will
be useful to establish its approximation ratio. These lemmas are essentially the same as the similar
ones from [4], except that we must adjust all the factors to deal with bipartite graphs, while [4]
considered only non-bipartite graphs. The basic analysis techniques remain the same, however, and
we only provide proofs of these lemmas for completeness.
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Lemma 7. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . Given k = γN , the performance of the greedy k-matching returned by Algorithm 3
with respect to the optimal perfect matching OPT is given by 3−2γγ .
Proof. The analysis here is essentially identical to that of a similar lemma in [4], except that
Lemma 6 gives a ratio of 3 instead of 2 between any edge and an undominated edge for bipartite
graphs. We include the whole analysis of the framework for completeness.
Let M be the greedy k-matching, and M∗ be the optimal perfect matching. We show the claim
by charging every edge in M∗ to one or more edges in the greedy matching M . Consider any edge
e∗ = (a, b) in M∗, the edge must belong to one of the following two types.
1. (Type I) Some edges consisting of a or b (both a and b) are present in M .
2. (Type II) No edge in M has a or b as an endpoint.
Suppose that M∗ contains m1 Type I edges, and m2 Type II edges. We know that m1 +m2 = N .
Let T ⊂ M denote the heaviest m12 edges in M . Initialize U as all the edges in M . We describe
our charging algorithm in three phases.
(First Phase) We can charge all Type I edges in M∗ to the edges in T , so that
∑
e∈T sewe ≥∑
e∈TypeI(M∗)we, se ≤ 2. We charge the edges as follows: Repeat until U contains no Type I edge:
pick a type I edge e∗ = (a, b) from U . Suppose that e = (a, c) is the first edge containing either a
or b that was added to M , Since we ≥ w∗e , charge e∗ to e, increase se by one and remove e∗ from
U. In the end, all the edges that are charged in M have se ≤ 2, and
∑
e se = m1 . We can transfer
the slots to the heaviest m12 edges in M , each has se ≤ 2. Keep transfering the slots to the heaviest
m1
µ edges in M , so that each edge has se ≤ µ.
(Second Phase) Repeat until se = µ for all e ∈ M\T or until U is empty: pick any arbitrary
edge e∗ from U and the smallest edge e ∈ M\T such that se < µ By Lemma 6 we∗ ≤ 3we, charge
e∗ using three slots of e, transfer slots to the heaviest edges e ∈ M\T such that se < µ. So e∗ is
charged by three slot from edges in M\T .
At the end of the second phase, |U | = max(0,m2 − (k − m1µ )× µ3 ).
(Third Phase) Repeat until U is empty: pick any arbitrary edge e∗ from U . Since w∗e ≤ 3we for
all e ∈M , charge e∗ uniformly to all edges in M , i.e., increase se by 3k for every e ∈M and remove
e∗ from U .
At the end of the third phase, for every e ∈M ,
se ≤ µ+ 3
k
max(0,m2 − (k − m1
µ
)× µ
3
)
Because m1 +m2 = N ,
se ≤ max(µ, 2m2 +N
k
)
Type II edges don’t share nodes with any of the k edges in M , so m2 + k ≤ N ,
se ≤ max(µ, 3N − 2k
k
)
se ≤ max(µ, 3− 2γ
γ
)
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Let µ = 3−2γγ ,
se ≤ 3− 2γ
γ
Lemma 8. Let GT = (XT ,YT , ET ) be a complete bipartite subgraph on the set of nodes XT ⊆ X ,
YT ⊆ Y, with |XT | = |YT | = n, and let M be any perfect matching on G = (X ,Y, E). Then, the
following is an upper bound on the weight of M ,
nw(M) ≤ (2 + N
n
)
∑
x∈XT
y∈YT
w(x, y) +
∑
x∈XT
y∈Y\YT
w(x, y) +
∑
x∈X\XT
y∈YT
w(x, y)
Proof. For e = (x, y) ∈M, e′ = (a, b) ∈ ET , by triangle inequality,
w(a, y) + w(a, b) + w(x, b) ≥ w(x, y)
Sum up for all (a, b) ∈ ET ,
n
∑
a∈XT
w(a, y) +
∑
a∈XT
b∈YT
w(a, b) + n
∑
b∈YT
w(x, b) ≥ n2w(x, y)
Sum up for all (x, y) ∈M ,
n
∑
a∈XT
y∈Y
w(a, y) +N
∑
a∈XT
b∈YT
w(a, b) + n
∑
b∈YT
x∈X
w(x, b) ≥ n2w(M)
Because Y = YT ∪ {Y\YT }, and X = XT ∪ {X\XT },
n(
∑
a∈XT
y∈YT
w(a, y) +
∑
a∈XT
y∈Y\YT
w(a, y)) +N
∑
a∈XT
b∈YT
w(a, b) + n(
∑
b∈YT
x∈XT
w(x, b) +
∑
b∈YT
x∈X\XT
w(x, b)) ≥ n2w(M)
Replace a with x, and b with y,
2n
∑
x∈XT
y∈YT
w(x, y) + n
∑
x∈XT
y∈Y\YT
w(x, y) + n
∑
x∈X\XT
y∈YT
w(x, y) +N
∑
x∈XT
y∈YT
w(x, y) ≥ n2w(M)
nw(M) ≤ (2 + N
n
)
∑
x∈XT
y∈YT
w(x, y) +
∑
x∈XT
y∈Y\YT
w(x, y) +
∑
x∈X\XT
y∈YT
w(x, y)
We can now state the algorithm for α ≥ 12 . The algorithm is a mix of greedy and random
algorithms: for graph G = (X ,Y, E), given top αN of P (X ) and top αN of P (Y), run Algorithm 3
on k = αN , to obtain the matching M0. This is possible using the preference we are given.
One method we could do at this point is to form a random matching on the rest of the agents.
However, this will not form a good approximation, as there are examples when all the high-weight
edges are between nodes matched in M0 and nodes which are unmatched. Another method is
to randomly choose some matched nodes from M0, make then unmatched, and form a random
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bipartite matching between all the agents which were not matched in M0, and the nodes which
we chose from M0 to become unmatched. This second method is likely to add high-weight edges
between nodes in M0 and nodes outside of it to our matching. Mixing over these two methods
actually returns a high-weight matching in expectation.
Note that for α > 34 this algorithm does not seem to provide better guarantees than for α =
3
4 .
Because of this, for α > 34 , we simply run the same algorithm for α =
3
4
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for two-sided matching with partial ordinal information (12 ≤ α ≤
3
4).
Input : X ,Y, top αN of P (X ), top αN of P (Y)
Output: Perfect Bipartite Matching M
Initialize E to be complete bipartite graph on X ,Y, and M1 = M2 = ∅ ;
Let M0 be the output returned by Algorithm 3 for E, k = αN ;
Let XT be the set of nodes in X matched in M0, YT be the set of nodes in Y matched in M0,
and T be the complete bipartite graph on XT ,YT ;
Let XB = X\XT , YB = Y\YT , and B be the complete bipartite graph on XB,YB;
First Algorithm;
M1 = M0∪ (The perfect matching output by Algorithm 8 on B);
Second Algorithm;
Choose (2α− 1)N edges from M0 uniformly at random and add them to M2 ;
Let XA be the set of nodes in XT and not in M2, YA be the set of nodes in YT and not in M2;
Let EAB be the edges of the complete bipartite graph (XA,YB) and E′AB be the edges of the
complete bipartite graph (XB, YA) ;
Run random bipartite matching on the set of edges in EAB and E
′
AB separately to obtain
perfect bipartite matchings and add the edges returned by the algorithm to M2;
Final Output: Return M1 with probability
3−2α
3−α and M2 with probability
α
3−α .
Note that for α > 34 this algorithm does not seem to provide better guarantees than for α =
3
4 .
Because of this, for α > 34 , we simply run the same algorithm for α =
3
4 .
Theorem 4. Algorithm 4 returns a (3−2α)(3−α)
2α2−3α+3 -approximation to the maximum-weight perfect
matching given two-sided ordering when 12 ≤ α ≤ 34 .
Proof. |XT | = |YT | = αN , |XB| = |YB| = (1− α)N .
By Lemma 7, w(M0) ≥ α3−2αOPT . By Lemma 3, the perfect matching output by Algorithm 8 on
B has expected weight at least 1(1−α)Nw(B). Therefore,
E[w(M1)] ≥ α
3− 2αOPT +
1
(1− α)Nw(B)
Because |XA| = |YA| = (1−α)N , and they are leftover nodes after (2α− 1)N nodes are chosen
uniformly at random from M0,
E[w(EAB) + w(E
′
AB)] =
1− α
α
w(T,B).
Recall that w(T,B) is the total weight of all edges between T and B. Let MAB be a random
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bipartite matching formed on edges EAB and E
′
AB. By Lemma 3,
E[w(MAB)] =
1
(1− α)NE[w(EAB)] +
1
(1− α)NE[w(E
′
AB)]
=
1
(1− α)NE[w(EAB) + w(E
′
AB)]
=
1
αN
w(T,B)
By Lemma 8, with M = OPT, T = B,n = (1− α)N :
(1− α)Nw(OPT ) ≤ (2 + 1
1− α)w(B) + w(T,B)
E[w(MAB)] =
1
αN
w(T,B)
≥ 1
αN
((1− α)Nw(OPT )− 3− 2α
1− α w(B))
M2 contains
2α−1
α fraction of edges randomly chosen from M0, together with MAB:
E[w(M2)] =
2α− 1
α
× α
3− 2αw(OPT ) + E[w(MAB)]
≥ 2α− 1
3− 2αw(OPT ) +
1
αN
((1− α)Nw(OPT )− 3− 2α
1− α w(B))
=
4α2 − 6α+ 3
α(3− 2α) w(OPT )−
3− 2α
α(1− α)Nw(B)
Return M1 with probability
3−2α
3−α and M2 with probability
α
3−α . Then, the expected weight of
our final matching is
3− 2α
3− α E[w(M1)] +
α
3− αE[w(M2)] ≥
2α2 − 3α+ 3
(3− 2α)(3− α)w(OPT ).
α ≤ 1
2
Unlike the case for α ≥ 12 , this case requires different techniques than in [4]. While the
techniques above would still work, they will not give us a bound as good as the one we form below.
The idea in this section is to do something similar to our one-sided algorithm for partial preferences:
run the greedy algorithm for a while, and then switch to random. Unfortunately, if we simply run
the greedy Algorithm 3 and then switch to random, this will not form a good approximation.
The reason why this is true is that an undominated edge which is picked by the greedy algorithm
may be much worse than the average weight of an edge, and so the approximation factor of the
random algorithm will dominate, giving only a 3-approximation. Even taking an undominated edge
uniformly at random has this problem. We can fix this, however, by picking each undominated edge
with an appropriate probability, as described below. Such an algorithm results in matchings which
are guaranteed to be better than either RSD or Random, thus allowing us to prove the result.
This algorithm guarantees that an undominated edge is chosen for any x in any bipartite graph
G. Now, before we reach an undominated edge, the weights of edges are non-decreasing in the
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Algorithm 5: Algorithm for two-sided matching with partial ordinal information (0 ≤ α ≤
1
2).
Input : X ,Y, top αN of P (X ) and P (Y)
Initialize M = ∅, G = (X ,Y, E) ;
while E 6= ∅ do
Pick an agent x uniformly at random from X ;
Let y denote x’s most preferred agent in Y ;
x1 ← x, y1 ← y, c← y1;
while (x1, y1) is not an undominated edge do
if c = y1 then
x1 ← y1’s most preferred agent in X ;
c← x1;
else
y1 ← x1’s most preferred agent in Y ;
c← y1;
end
end
Take (x1, y1) from E and add it to M ;
Remove x1, y1, and all edges containing x1 or y1 from the graph G ;
if |M | = αN then
break;
end
end
Run Algorithm 8 for the remaining graph G, add the edges returned by the algorithm to M .
Final Output: Return M .
order they are checked. Thus whenever a node x is picked, the algorithm adds an undominated
edge (x1, y1) to the matching which is guaranteed to have higher weight than all edges leaving x.
Note that it is not possible to apply this algorithm to one-sided matching because the preferences
of agents in Y are not given, and thus we cannot detect which edges are undominated.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 5 returns a (3−α)-approximation to the maximum-weight perfect matching
given two-sided ordering when 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 .
Proof. We use a similar method and the same notation as in Section 3 to proof this theorem.
Essentially, because we are always picking undominated edges, we can form a linear interpolation
between a factor of 2 and a factor of 3 for random matching, instead of between factors
√
2 + 1
and 3 as for one-sided preferences. The reason why we are able to form such an interpolation is
entirely because of the probabilities with which we choose the undominated edges; if we simply chose
arbitrary undominated edges or choose them uniformly at random, then there are examples where
the random edge weights will dominate and result in a poor approximation, since undominated
edges are only guaranteed to be within a factor of 3 of the average edge weight.
Besides those was used in the proof of Theorem 1, we introduce some new notation. Suppose
that Algorithm 5 picks x ∈ X ′, and end up with an undominated edge (x1, y1). Let λD(S, x) denote
the undominated edge picked by the algorithm for x in graph S, λD(S, x) = (x1, y1) = λ(S, x1)
in this case. And let RD(S, x) denote the remaining graph after removing λD(S, x) and the edges
connected to both vertexes of λD(S, x).
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We start with a lemma to bound the maximum weight matching,
Lemma 9. For any given subgraph S = (X ′,Y ′, E′), w(OPT (S)) ≤ 1|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′ w(OPT (RD(S, x)))+
2
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′ w(λD(S, x)).
Proof. Using the same notation as in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3, suppose that Algorithm 5 picks
x ∈ X ′, and end up with an undominated edge (x1, y1). Then OPT (RD(S, x)) = OPT (R(S, x1))
is at least as good as the matching obtained by removing P (x1) and P¯ (x1), and adding D(x1) to
OPT (S) (the rest stay the same):
w(OPT (RD(S, x))) ≥ w(OPT (S))− w(P (x1))− w(P¯ (x1)) + w(D(x1))
≥ w(OPT (S))− w(P (x1))− w(P¯ (x1))
Because λD(S, x) is an undominated edge, w(λD(S, x)) ≥ P (x1), w(λD(S, x)) ≥ P¯ (x1),
w(OPT (RD(S, x))) ≥ w(OPT (S))− 2w(λD(S, x))
Summing up for all x in X ′,∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (RD(S, x))) ≥ |X ′|w(OPT (S))− 2
∑
x∈X ′
w(λD(S, x))
w(OPT (S)) ≤ 1|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (RD(S, x))) +
2
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(λD(S, x)).
Then we bound w(OPT (G)) by the sum of expected weights of chosen edges in Algorithm 5,
and the weight of the remaining subgraph. We still use Algi(S) as the expected weight of chosen
edge in round i, but note that for any x, the chosen edge is λD(G, x) instead of λ(G, x) as in
Theorem 3. By an identical argument as in our Lemma 4, we have that the following holds:
w(OPT (G)) ≤ 2
∑`
i=1
Algi(G) + 3E[Rand(L(G, `))].
We need to prove that a version of Lemma 5 still holds for Algorithm 5, as the edges are chosen
differently from RSD in each step. In other words, we need to be able to compare Rand(L(G, `))
and Algi. This is where we need to use the fact that each undominated edge is carefully chosen with
a specific probability. Let G′ = L(G,αN) be a random variable representing the graph obtained
by running our greedy algorithm on G for αN rounds, which we can always do if we are given the
top αN preferences of every agent.
Lemma 10. ∀i ≤ αN , Algi(G) is heavier than the expected average edge weight in G′, i.e.,
Algi(G) ≥ E[Avg(G′].
Proof. We must show that Alg1(G) ≥ Alg2(G). To see this,
Alg2(G) =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
1
|X | − 1
∑
y∈X−λD(G,x)
w(λD(RD(G, x), y))
≤ 1|X |
∑
x∈X
1
|X | − 1
∑
y∈X−λD(G,x)
w(λD(G, y))
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The inequality above is because the undominated edge found after selecting y and then following
the agents’ top preferences in a smaller graph RD(G, x) is at most that in a larger graph G.
Fix some x ∈ X , and let (x1, y1) be the edge λD(G, x) be the edge added to the matching if x
is picked by our algorithm, and thus x1 is the node removed from X . Note that for the case when
x 6= x1, we still have that w(λD(G, x)) = w(λD(G, x1)), since if x1 is picked by our algorithm, then
the undominated edge next to it (x1, y1) is immediately returned. Therefore, in the sum above,
we can replace w(λD(G, x)) (since x still remains in X − λD(G, x)) with w(λD(G, x1)), and thus
equivalently make the sum be over X − x instead of over X − λD(G, x).
Alg2(G) =≤ 1|X |
∑
x∈X
1
|X | − 1
∑
y∈X−x
w(λD(G, y))
=
|X | − 1
|X |(|X | − 1)
∑
y∈X
w(λD(G, y))
= Alg1(G)
By the same argument, we know that Algi(G) ≥ Algi+1(G) for all i.
All that is left is to compare AlgαN+1(G) with E[Avg(G
′)]. We know that the first round of RSD
on any graph always performs better than the average edge weight. And for every x that is chosen
uniformly at random in the first step of Algorithm 5, the weight of final chosen edge λD(x) is no
smaller than λ(x). Therefore, the expected weight of chosen edge in the first round of Algorithm 5 is
no smaller than that of RSD, thus better than the average edge weight, AlgαN+1(G) ≥ E[Avg(G′)].
This concludes the proof.
Finally, to finish the proof of Theorem 5. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, it is easy
to show that there is a linear tradeoff from 3 to 2-approximation for α = 0 to α = 1, which
gives w(OPT (G)) ≤ (3− α)E[w(M)], in which M is a random variable representing the matching
returned by Algorithm 5.
5 Total Ordering of Edge Weights
For the setting in which we are given the top αN2 edges of G in order, we prove that for α = 34 ,
we can obtain an approximation of 53 in expectation. For larger α, however, more information does
not seem to help, and so we simply use the algorithm for α = 34 for any α >
3
4 .
Algorithm 6: Greedy Algorithm for Max k-Matching given the total ordering of edge weights.
Initialize M = ∅, E is the valid set of edges initialized to the complete bipartite graph G ;
while E 6= ∅ do
Pick the heaviest edge e = (x, y) from E and add it to M ;
Remove x, y, and all edges containing x or y from E ;
if |M | = k then
break ;
end
end
Final Output: Return M .
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Lemma 11. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . Given k = γN , the performance of the greedy k-matching returned by Algorithm 6
with respect to the optimal perfect matching OPT is at least γ, for γ ≤ 12 .
Proof. Let M be the matching returned by Algorithm 3 for k = N . From Lemma 7, w(M) ≥
1
2w(OPT ). In the proof of Lemma 7, each edge in M is charged at most twice by edges of OPT,
and there are N charges in total. Transfer all the charges to the highest weight N2 edges in M ;
this tells us that the highest weight N2 edges of M are at least
1
2w(OPT ). Further transfer all the
charges to the highest weight γN edges in M ; this results in each such edge being charged to 1/γ
times by edges of OPT. Therefore, the highest weight γN edges of M are at least 1γw(OPT ) in
total.
Same as Algorithm 3, Algorithm 6 also picks an undominated edge each round; the difference is
the edges in the matching are picked in non-decreasing order. So Algorithm 6 returns a k-matching
with the same weight as the highest γN edges in the perfect matching returned by Algorithm 3 on
the same graph, which gives at least 1γw(OPT ).
Lemma 12. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . Given the order of the top αN2 edges in the graph, we are able to run greedy
k-matching by Algorithm 6 for k = (1−√1− α)N .
Proof. In the first step of Algorithm 6, the heaviest edge is taken, and 2N − 1 edges are removed,
so at most 2N − 1 edges are lost from the top αN2 edges. After the first k steps of Algorithm 6,
the total number of removed edges is:
2N − 1 + 2(N − 1)− 1 + ...+ 2(N − (k − 1))− 1
= 2(N +N − 1 + ...+N − (k − 1))− k
= 2Nk − k2
Given the order of top αN2 edges, we are able to run Algorithm 6 for at least k steps until
2Nk − k2 = αN2. Solve the equation for k, k = (1−√1− α)N .
The algorithm for bipartite matching with partial ordinal information is similar to that with
partial two-sided ordinal information, except that we only need to consider the case that k ≤ 12N ,
i.e., 1−√1− α ≤ 12 , α ≤ 34 . In two-sided model, we are given the top αN preferences for both sets
of agents, and able to run greedy algorithm for k = αN . While in total ordering model, we could
only run greedy algorithm for k = (1−√1− α)N given the order of the top αN2 edges. Different
from two-sided model, α does not equal to the number of agent pairs we are able to match by
greedy algorithm in total ordering model.
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Algorithm 7: Algorithm for matching given partial total ordering.
Input : X ,Y, order of the top αN2 edges in the graph.
Output: Perfect Bipartite Matching M
Initialize E to be complete bipartite graph on X ,Y, and M1 = M2 = ∅ ;
Let M0 be the output returned by Algorithm 6 for E, k = (1−
√
1− α)N . Let
α1 = 1−
√
1− α, then k = α1N ;
Let XT be the set of nodes in X matched in M0, YT be the set of nodes in Y matched in M0,
and T be the complete bipartite graph on XT ,YT ;
Let XB be the set of nodes in X not matched in M0, YB be the set of nodes in Y not
matched in M0, and B is the complete bipartite graph on XB,YB;
First Algorithm;
M1 = M0∪ (The perfect matching output by Algorithm 8 on B);
Second Algorithm;
Choose (1− 2α1)N nodes both from XB and YB uniformly at random, get the perfect
matching output by Algorithm 8 on these nodes and add the results to M2 ;
Let XA be the set of nodes in XB and not in M2, YA be the set of nodes in YB and not in M2;
Let EAT be the edges of the complete bipartite graph (XA,YT ) and E′AT be the edges of the
complete bipartite graph (XT , YA) ;
Run random bipartite matching on the set of edges in EAT and E
′
AT separately to obtain
perfect bipartite matchings and add the edges returned by the algorithm to M2;
Final Output: Return M1 with probability
2
2+
√
1−α and M2 with probability
√
1−α
2+
√
1−α .
Theorem 6. Algorithm 7 returns a 2+
√
1−α
2−√1−α -approximation to the maximum-weight matching in
expectation for α ≤ 34 , as shown in Figure 1.
Proof. By Lemma 12, we are able to run Algorithm 6 for k = (1 − √1− α)N . We analyze the
algorithm when α ≤ 34 , α1 = 1−
√
1− α ≤ 12 .
|XT | = |YT | = α1N , |XB| = |YB| = (1− α1)N .
By Lemma 11, w(M0) ≥ α1w(OPT ). By Lemma 3, the perfect matching output by Algorithm 8
on B has expected weight 1(1−α1)Nw(B). Thus,
E[w(M1)] ≥ α1w(OPT ) + 1
(1− α1)Nw(B)
Analysis of E[w(M2)] is very similar to the case when α1 ≥ 12 for Algorithm 4, except that now
B is larger than T , and so we form a random bipartite matching using all of the nodes in T instead
of just some of them. Formally, because |XA| = |YA| = α1N , and they are leftover nodes after
(1− 2α1)N nodes are chosen uniformly at random from B, we know that
E[w(EAT ) + w(E
′
AT )] =
α1
1− α1w(T,B).
Let MAT be the random bipartite matching formed between sets A and T . By Lemma 3,
E[w(MAT )] =
1
α1N
E[w(EAT )] +
1
α1N
E[w(E
′
AT )]
=
1
(1− α1)Nw(T,B)
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By Lemma 8, setting M = OPT, T = B,n = (1− α1)N ,
(1− α1)Nw(OPT ) ≤ (2 + 1
1− α1 )w(B) + w(T,B).
Thus,
E[w(MAT )] =
1
(1− α1)Nw(T,B)
≥ 1
(1− α1)N ((1− α1)Nw(OPT )−
3− 2α1
1− α1 w(B))
E[w(M2)] =
1− 2α1
1− α1 ×
1
(1− α1)Nw(B) + E[w(MAT )]
≥ 1− 2α1
(1− α1)2Nw(B) +
1
(1− α1)N ((1− α1)Nw(OPT )−
3− 2α1
1− α1 w(B))
= w(OPT )− 2
(1− α1)2Nw(B)
Return M1 with probability
2
3−α1 =
2
2+
√
1−α , and M2 with probability
1−α1
3−α1 =
√
1−α
2+
√
1−α ,
2
3− α1E[w(M1)] +
1− α1
3− α1E[w(M2)] ≥
1 + α1
3− α1w(OPT )
=
2−√1− α
2 +
√
1− αw(OPT )
6 One-sided Preferences with Restricted Edge Weights
In previous sections, we made the assumption that the agents lie in a metric space, and thus the
edge weights, although unknown to us, must follow the triangle inequality. In this section we once
again consider the most restrictive type of agent preferences — that of one-sided preferences — but
now instead of assuming that agents lie in a metric space, we instead consider settings where edges
weights cannot be infinitely different from each other. This applies to settings where the agents
are at least somewhat indifferent and the items are somewhat similar; the least-preferred agent and
the most-preferred items differ only by a constant factor to any agent. Indeed, when for example
purchasing a house in a reasonable market (i.e., once houses that almost no one would buy have
been removed from consideration), it is unlikely that any agent would like house x so much more
than house y that they would be willing to pay hundreds of times more for x than for y.
More formally, for each agent i ∈ X , we are given a strict preference ordering Pi over the agents
in Y. In this section we assume that the highest weight edge emax is at most β times of the lowest
weight edge emin. We normalize the lowest weight edge emin in the graph to w(emin) = 1; then for
any edge e ∈ E, w(e) ≤ β. We use similar analysis as in Section 3, except that instead of getting
bounds by using the triangle inequality, the relationships among edge weights are bounded by our
assumption of the highest and lowest weight edge ratio. As stated above, we no longer assume the
agents lie in a metric space in this section.
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Theorem 7. Suppose G = (X ,Y, E) is a complete bipartite graph on the set of nodes X ,Y with
|X | = |Y| = N . w(emin) = 1, ∀e ∈ E, w(e) ≤ β. The expected weight of the perfect matching
returned by Algorithm 1 is w(M) ≥ 1√
β− 3
4
+ 1
2
w(OPT ).
Figure 4: β vs. approximation ratio of RSD on restricted weight bipartite graph. For edges with a
small difference in weight, we still obtain a reasonable approximation to the optimum matching.
Proof. We use the same notation as in Section 3. Once again, our proof relies on the following
claim, similar to Lemma 2. Once the statement below is proven, the rest of the proof proceeds
exactly as in Theorem 1, simply replacing
√
2 + 1 with
√
β − 34 + 12 .
Lemma 13. For any given subgraph S = (X ′,Y ′, E′), one of the following two cases must be true:
Case 1, w(OPT (S)) ≤ 1|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′ w(OPT (R(S, x))) +
√
β− 3
4
+ 1
2
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′ w(λ(x))
Case 2, w(OPT (S)) ≤ (
√
β − 34 + 12)w(Min(S))
Proof. Again, we use the same notation as in Section 3.
We’ll prove Lemma 13 by showing that if Case 2 is not true, then Case 1 must be true.
Suppose Case 2 is not true, w(OPT (S)) > (
√
β − 34 + 12)w(Min(S)).
Suppose that random serial dictatorship picks x ∈ X ′. Just as in the proof of Lemma 2, we
obtain that
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (R(x))) ≥ (1− 1|X ′|)w(OPT (S))−
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
(w(P¯ (x))− w(D(x))) (4)
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We know that ∀e ∈ E′, 1 ≤ w(e) ≤ β. So w(D(x)) ≥ 1, w(P¯ (x)) ≤ β, and thus
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
(w(P¯ (x))− w(D(x))) ≤ β − 1 (5)
∀x ∈ X ′, w(P (x)) ≤ w(λ(x)), so it is obvious that w(OPT (S)) ≤∑x∈X ′ w(λ(x)).
Min(S) is a perfect matching, so w(Min(S)) ≥ |X ′|. By our assumption,
|X ′| ≤ w(Min(S)) < 1√
β − 34 + 12
w(OPT (S)) (6)
Combining Inequalities 4, 5, and 6,
1
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(OPT (R(x))) ≥ w(OPT (S))− 1|X ′|w(OPT (S))−
1
|X ′|(β − 1)|X
′|
≥ w(OPT (S))− 1|X ′|w(OPT (S))−
1
|X ′|(β − 1)
1√
β − 34 + 12
w(OPT (S))
= w(OPT (S))− 1|X ′|(1 +
β − 1√
β − 34 + 12
)w(OPT (S))
= w(OPT (S))−
√
β − 34 + 12
|X ′| w(OPT (S))
≥ w(OPT (S))−
√
β − 34 + 12
|X ′|
∑
x∈X ′
w(λ(x))
This completes the proof of the theorem.
7 Lower Bound Examples
In this section, we provide some example to study the lower bound of algorithms on maximum
weight bipartite graph perfect matching, given two-sided or one-sided ordinal information.
7.1 Lower Bound of Two-sided Ordinal Information
Example Consider a bipartite graph G = (X ,Y, E), X = {a, b}, Y = {c, d}. Let  be a very
small positive number. Consider two sets of weight assignment that have the same two-sided
ordinal preferences in metric space: W1 : w(a, c) = w(b, d) = 1 + , w(b, c) = 3, w(a, d) = 1.
W2 : w(a, c) = w(b, d) = 1 − , w(b, c) = 1, w(a, d) = . The maximum weight perfect matching
for W1 is M1 = {(a, d), (b, c)}, while for W2 is M2 = {(a, c), (b, d)}. Applying any randomized
algorithm choosing M1 with probability p and M2 with probability 1 − p to these two weight
settings, the optimal algorithm is when p = 12 , gives a 1.33-approximation.
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7.2 Lower Bound of One-sided Ordinal Information
Example For one-sided ordinal information, consider a graph G = (X ,Y, E), |X | = |Y| = N ,
X = {x1, x2, ...xN}, Y = {y1, y2, ..., yN}. Each agent in X have the same preferences over agents
in Y as y1 > y2 > ... > yN , because of this setting, no random algorithm could distinguish agents
and get a better performance than random algorithm. Assign the weights of the graph as: for a
certain number ν ∈ [0, 1], when i <= ν, w(xi, yj) = 3 for j <= i, all other edges have weight 1.
The maximum matching is {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), ..., (aN , bN )}, with a total weight (2ν + 1)N . Random
matching of this graph gets an expected weight of (ν( 1N + ν) + 1)N , when N is large, the weight
approaches (ν2 + 1)N . When ν =
√
5−1
2 , random algorithm gets a 1.62-approximation, which is a
lower bound of one-sided ordinal information setting.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we quantified the tradeoffs between the amount of ordinal information available, and
the quality of solutions produced by our ordinal approximation algorithms, for metric maximum-
weight bipartite matchings. For example, if we are able to collect preference data through surveys,
but for each extra preference we must perform a certain extra amount of market research (i.e.,
increasing α comes at a cost), then our findings would quantify how big we should make α in order
to form a good approximation to the best possible matching. All of this is without knowing the
true numerical weights, only ordinal information.
One thing to note here is that asking people to list their preference orderings, even partial
preference orderings for relatively small α, may be prohibitive. Agents are usually willing to name
their top 3-10 choices, but not more than that. Notice, however, that all our algorithms can be
thought of differently. For example, RSD does not actually require the preference ordering as an
input. It simply needs to ask each agent a single question: what is you favorite agent who has
not been matched yet? Similarly, our other algorithms can be considered to ask agents a series of
questions about their preferences, all of the same form. Such questions (determining their favorite
from a set) are usually much easier for agents to answer than the question of specifying a preference
ordering.
One clear research direction is to relax the assumption that we can only obtain ordinal informa-
tion. What if we could also obtain some numerical information, but at further cost? What is the
tradeoff between quality of solution formed and the amount of numerical information we obtain?
What if we could ask the agents more complex questions than “Who is your favorite unmatched
agent?”, but were limited in the number of times we could ask such questions? We leave these
important directions for future work.
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